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Outsourcing Covert Activities 
Laura A. Dickinson* 
Over the past decade, the United States has radically shifted the way it 
projects its power overseas.  Instead of using full-time employees of foreign 
affairs agencies to implement its policies, the government now deploys a 
wide range of contractors and grantees, hired by both for-profit and non-
profit entities.  Thus, while traditionally we relied on diplomats, spies, and 
soldiers to protect and promote our interests abroad, increasingly we have 
turned to hired guns.  Contrast the first Gulf War to later conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  During the Gulf War the ratio of contractors to troops 
was 1 to 100; now, with approximately 260,000 contractors working for the 
State Department, Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in Iraq and Afghanistan, that ratio has 
often exceeded 1 to 1.1  To be sure, U.S. history is rich with examples of 
contractors; the privateers of the Revolutionary period are a case in point.  
But our current turn to privatized labor does reflect a new trend, spurred by 
the post-Cold War decline of the standing military and the elimination of 
the draft, supported by the public’s faith (not always backed up by data) 
that the private sector can perform work more efficiently than government 
employees, and fueled by the exigencies of the war on terror in the 
aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001.2  Many of these modern 
contractors perform logistics functions, such as delivering meals to troops 
or cleaning latrines on the battlefield.  Others guard diplomats, convoys, 
and military bases.  But contractors have also gathered intelligence, 
interrogated detainees, and engaged in tactical maneuvers, sometimes under 
circumstances involving hostile fire. 
All of this outsourcing tests our commitment not to contract out core 
governmental functions.  Indeed, while the United States officially does not 
allow security contractors to engage in military action,3 many contractors 
have tangled with foreign populations in ways that look very much like 
combat.  For example, in a notorious 2007 incident in Baghdad’s Nisour 
 
 * Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor of Law, The George Washington 
University Law School. 
 1. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, TRANSFORMING 
WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 20 (2011) (final report to 
Congress), available at http://www.whs.mil/library/Reports/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf. 
 2. For a more thorough account of the forces spurring the growing use of foreign 
affairs contractors, see LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, 23-39 (2011). 
 3. See, e.g., Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01, Performance 
of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227, 56229 (Sept. 12, 
2011) (adding . . . “[a]ll combat” and “security operations in certain situations connected 
with combat or potential combat” to the “illustrative list of inherently governmental 
functions”). 
13__DICKINSON_V10_010312 (CLEAN).DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2012  3:55 PM 
522 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 5:521 
Square, security guards employed by the firm then known as Blackwater, 
under contract with the U.S. government, fired into a crowd and killed 
civilians.  Elsewhere, contract interrogators hired by the Department of the 
Interior actually supervised uniformed military police officers who harshly 
questioned and abused detainees at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison.4  And while 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DoD have now formally banned 
the use of contract interrogators,5 and DoD has outlawed intelligence 
gathering by contractors, the lines appear to be blurred on the ground.6  
Indeed, even after the DoD ban, former intelligence operative Duane 
Clarridge reportedly established a private network of spies and provided 
information gathered by these agents to the U.S. government.7 
The ever-expanding use of contractors threatens core public values 
because the mechanisms of accountability and oversight that the United 
States has generally used to curb abuses by government employees do not 
translate well to contractors.  Not all contractors are bad apples, of course, 
and over 1,350 have died protecting U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.8  
Yet outsourcing as it is currently practiced threatens core commitments not 
to use torture and to respect the human dignity of individuals overseas, or 
the commitment to use force in a limited fashion that does not target 
civilians, or the commitment to have some degree of transparency and 
public participation in decisions to pursue aggressive activities abroad.  For 
example, although the soldiers who abused Abu Ghraib prisoners faced 
courts-martial and were punished for their roles in the abuse, no contractors 
have been held accountable in that instance.  Jurisdictional loopholes in our 
criminal law, combined with weak enforcement mechanisms and limited 
evidence gathering capabilities, have enabled them to escape scrutiny.  
Criminal proceedings against the Blackwater guards involved in the Nisour 
Square incident have also met with difficulties.9 
Government privatization of covert activities is of particular concern.  
To be sure, reining in the excesses of government actors engaged in covert 
operations is a challenge even without outsourcing.  This is because it is 
much harder to gather information about such activities, regardless of 
 
 4. GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY 
AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 50-51 (2004), available at http://www.cbc.ca/ 
news/background/iraq/pdf/fay_report20040825.pdf. 
 5. FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 110-84, §1038 (2009); 
Siobhan Gorman, CIA Bans Interrogations by Outside Contractors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 
2009, at A3; DFARS 237.173  (2010).  The statute does allow the agencies to waive the ban 
in the interest of national security. 
 6. Mark Mazzetti, Former Spy with Agenda Operates a Private C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2011, at A1. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Deaths Matter, 38 PARAMETERS 78, 78 
(2008). 
 9. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 
40-68. 
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whether they are carried out by government employees or by contractors.  
And the tools of oversight and accountability we might deploy to control 
covert actors are especially limited because of the secrecy that these kinds 
of operations demand.  Increased oversight by Congress and the general 
public through enhanced transparency laws such as an expanded Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA), greater whistleblower protections, and agency 
reporting, may often be impractical. 
Yet reforms are possible, and indeed critical, if we care about 
preserving core public values in the arena of covert operations.  History 
tells us that we should care about preserving those values, both because 
covert operations can run amok without adequate accountability and 
because effective oversight can actually improve the intelligence gathering 
function itself.  In my recent book, Outsourcing War and Peace, I lay out a 
reform agenda for increasing oversight and accountability of private 
contractors performing a range of military, security, and broader foreign 
affairs functions.10  While not all of these proposals are pertinent to 
contractors performing covert activities, many can be deployed in the 
intelligence context.  This essay will briefly outline how these reforms 
might apply to the contracting out of covert operations. 
Before doing so, however, I should describe three assumptions 
underlying my discussion.  First, I start from the premise that we should 
remain committed to certain core public values, such as the protection of 
human dignity, even as we promote our security interests abroad.  These 
core values are reflected, for example, in our adherence to the international 
treaty prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  
They are likewise reflected in our adherence to the Geneva Conventions 
and our commitment to protect civilians during armed conflict.  We might 
sometimes have disputes about where to draw the line, but we should be 
able to agree that some lines may not be crossed.  And, as already 
discussed, these lines both protect our values and also are likely to 
contribute to more effective operations.  Yet, to the extent that there are 
some who wish to challenge whether any constraints should limit the scope 
of our covert operations, I will not engage that debate here. 
Second, I assume that another core value we share consists of some 
degree of public participation in the decisions about how we use our covert 
actors overseas.  National security may require secrecy for these operations 
to be successful, but I assume that we want some measure of public 
engagement in the decisionmaking about how we prosecute these activities, 
as well as some measure of transparency, though again we might disagree 
about where to draw the line.  Covert operations and public engagement are 
not incompatible.  Some “covert” operations, for example, are reported in 
the press. 
 
 10. See DICKINSON, supra note 2. 
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Third, I assume that outsourcing, even of covert operations, is here to 
stay, at least for a long time to come.  Again, we may draw lines, such as 
with respect to offensive combat and interrogation, but for a variety of 
political reasons, outsourcing is not likely to disappear any time soon.  Most 
notably, a political culture that assumes the efficiency of the private sector 
(without necessarily accumulating data to prove it) makes the hiring of 
contract workers much easier politically than expanding the number of 
government employees or uniformed soldiers.  Providing contracts to 
private employees serves the illusion that “government is not big” or “is 
getting smaller.” As a consequence, the starting point for my argument is 
that we should accept the reality of outsourcing and seek to control it better.  
We are in a brave new world, and we cannot ignore it.  Accordingly, our 
best way forward is not to rail against the use of contractors in toto, but to 
provide better accountability for the contractors upon whom we 
increasingly rely. 
A recent example illustrates why better accountability would be useful, 
both strategically and morally.  In February of 2011 Pakistani officials 
arrested Raymond Davis after he killed two men on a street in Lahore.11  
Although American officials assert that Davis acted in self-defense when 
the men attacked him, the Pakistani press, outraged, accused the United 
States of letting its contract spies run amok on Pakistani soil. They alleged 
that the man was an employee of Blackwater.  U.S. authorities initially 
denied that he was a contractor, claiming that Davis was a consular 
employee and therefore entitled to some form of immunity in Pakistani 
courts.  Eventually they conceded that Davis was in fact a CIA contractor, 
and indeed an employee of Blackwater, confirming the Pakistanis’ worst 
fears.12 
Significantly, one of the core concerns of the Pakistanis was the lack of 
accountability for U.S. contractors operating overseas.  Whether or not 
Davis acted inappropriately, there has not been a good track record of 
accountability.  To be sure, there have been a few cases in which U.S. 
courts have convicted contractors for abuse.  For example, in August 2006 
David Passaro, a contractor, was convicted in the U.S. District Court for 
North Carolina for abusing an Afghan detainee during an interrogation.13 
But other proceedings have been less successful.  As noted above, the case 
against the Blackwater guards implicated in the Nisour Square incident has 
faced numerous difficulties, and no contractors were held accountable for 
their role at Abu Ghraib. 
 
 11. Mark Mazetti, Ashley Parker, Jane Perlez & Eric Schmitt, American Held in 
Pakistan Worked with C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 22, 2011, at A1. 
 12. Id.  Blackwater has changed its name to Xe Services, and more recently it adopted 
the name Academi.  The Security Contractor Formerly Known as Blackwater Changes Its 
Name Again, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 12, 2011. 
 13. Dafna Linzer & Josh White, Ex-Contractor Guilty of Assaulting Detaineee, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at A08. 
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This lack of accountability is an important part of the way host nations 
such as Pakistan perceive contractors.  Host nation citizens routinely 
attribute the actions of contractors to the U.S. government.  As one military 
lawyer I interviewed for my book noted, “If an incident [in which a 
contractor used force] occurred in our area,” it was to the “contractor’s 
advantage to fly under the radar.”14  But it was “[the military’s] job to 
respond, to take the flak from families.”15  The “military has to clean it up, 
conduct an investigation.”16  Thus, the United States is not deemed any less 
responsible just because it has deployed contractors rather than soldiers.  
Yet the lack of oversight for contractors is evident to all – and so the use of 
contractors is viewed as an effort to flout existing rules and norms.  A more 
effective system of accountability would send a strong signal to host nations 
that contractors, like government employees, must adhere to the core 
commitments of the United States. 
So how can we provide better oversight regarding contractors, in 
particular those who are engaged in covert operations?  We should focus on 
four mechanisms of accountability and constraint.  The first is legal 
accountability, the extent to which private contractors might be amenable to 
criminal prosecution or civil suit in international or domestic legal forums.  
There are multiple immunity and jurisdictional issues that limit the 
possibilities for contractor accountability.  Nonetheless, though far from 
perfect, some legal avenues do exist, at least in theory, to hold contractors 
accountable through either domestic criminal prosecutions or civil suits.  
Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that privatization removes the 
possibility of legal accountability altogether.  Indeed, while significant gaps 
persist in existing criminal and civil law, the problem of legal 
accountability is not so much a deficiency of law on the books as it is a 
failure of law in action.  Rather than focusing on writing new laws, we 
should devote our energy to redesigning our institutions of enforcement.17 
Nevertheless, because legal accountability is weak in the foreign affairs 
context with regard to either state or non-state actors, alternative 
mechanisms of control are essential.  A second mechanism, therefore, is 
contractual accountability and constraint.  Contractual terms might 
explicitly extend the norms of public international law to contractors 
(thereby addressing any potential “state action” problems in international 
 
 14. DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 178. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. For example, a dedicated unit could be established within the Department of 
Justice, combined with a team of FBI agents trained to work in conflict zones and 
collaborate with military investigators and state department officials.  This would establish a 
cadre of people with the expertise to build these very difficult cases.  Such a reform, while 
perhaps not a complete solution, could go a long way toward curing some of the problems 
we’ve seen in the past.  See DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 63.  
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law), provide more specific terms (such as training requirements and 
performance benchmarks), assure better monitoring and oversight, require 
contractors to submit to outside accreditation by third-party organizations, 
and offer better enforcement mechanisms, such as third-party beneficiary 
suits.18 
Public participation is a third mechanism of accountability and 
constraint, which, while less available when dealing with covert activities, 
may nonetheless be relevant to some degree.  Here I refer to public 
participation within the United States as well as within the host nation.  The 
latter is complicated by the fact that the communities directly affected will 
often have only minimal ability to influence the distant government 
overseeing the contract or its polity. Thus, it is especially important to build 
into the privatized relationship mechanisms that will require contractors to 
consult with affected populations concerning the design of projects and to 
offer opportunities for feedback or the filing of grievances concerning 
implementation. 
Finally, organizational constraints are important to consider.  In my 
book, I use organizational theory to explore ways that government and 
private entities (both for-profit and not-for-profit) develop internal 
organizational structures and norms of behavior that render them more or 
less likely to conform to various public law values.  For example, in the 
years following Vietnam, the U.S. military built a culture of respect for the 
values embedded in international law, including those rules addressing the 
treatment of detainees and limits on the use of force during armed conflict.  
The military achieved this goal in part through organizational structure, by 
increasing the role and authority of uniformed judge advocates in the field.19  
And despite actions by civilian officials within the George W. Bush 
administration aimed at weakening that commitment post September 11, 
2001, it is significant that the uniformed leadership persisted in its efforts to 
protect those values.   
Yet the use of private military contractors – especially interrogators and 
security contractors – has effectively weakened that culture on the ground, 
leading to abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib.  Interviews with uniformed 
judge advocates about the growing role of security contractors shows how 
the rise of such contractors threatens the judge advocates’ ability to protect 
public values on the battlefield. Use of military contractors also muddies 
command lines of authority in theater and creates conflicts between 
 
 18. Government contracts typically may be enforced only by the contractor (or a firm 
that could have been awarded the contract) or the government.  See, e.g., Scott v. United 
States, 78 Fed. Cl. 151 (2007).  Some commentators have suggested that suits brought by 
third party beneficiaries to the contracts might be a possibility, and there have been some 
examples of courts recognizing this theory in the health care privatization context.  See, e.g., 
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 603, 608 
(2000). 
 19. For a more detailed analysis, see DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 144-188. 
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uniformed personnel and their higher paid private counterparts.  Finally, the 
contract firms do not have the robust organizational infrastructure of the 
U.S. military or the equivalent of judge advocates, who can help to 
inculcate rule-of-law values within firms.  Perhaps these are arguments 
against outsourcing itself.  Yet the power of organizational structure and 
culture might also be harnessed as a mode of controlling private military 
companies.  Firms, even those engaged in covert operations, could be better 
integrated into the military’s judge advocate system, for example if judge 
advocates trained the contractors.  Alternatively, firms might implement 
organizational reforms that could mitigate some of the problems. 
Let us now consider how these four mechanisms of accountability and 
constraint might apply to contractors engaged in covert operations. 
I.  LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONSTRAINT 
In the case of legal accountability, we ought to consider both 
jurisdictional defects as well as enforcement issues.  In both contexts, 
reforms are relevant to contractors working in covert operations, whether 
they are gathering intelligence, providing security, or performing some 
other function.  With respect to criminal accountability, in the case of 
extreme abuse, lack of clarity about federal court jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial acts has been a stumbling block.  For example, the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) is the primary law that gives U.S. 
courts the power to try contractors when they are accused of committing 
serious abuses.20  However, MEJA does not explicitly govern contractors 
who work for agencies other than the DoD, such as the State Department 
contractors involved in the Nisour Square incident.21  It is vital that 
Congress close the jurisdictional gap, and efforts are underway to do so in 
the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA), sponsored by Senator 
Patrick Leahy, former Senator Edward Kaufman, and Representative David 
Price, which is now pending in Congress.22 
One of the hurdles in enacting CEJA is apparently the concern among 
the intelligence agencies, that, as drafted, the bill would give federal courts 
jurisdiction over too broad a swath of federal crimes.  Indeed, virtually any 
federal crime a contractor commits overseas, even minor non-violent 
crimes, would come within federal jurisdiction.  This concern is particularly 
relevant to covert operatives, whether contractors or government 
employees.  However, regardless of whether one agrees that such operatives 
 
 20. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§3261, 3267 (2006). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. §3267 (1)(A)(II)(ii) (2006) (extending jurisdiction only to those 
contractors from other agencies whose “employment relates to supporting a Department of 
Defense mission”). 
 22. S. 1145, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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should have the leeway to engage in actions that would be minor federal 
crimes in the United States, there is arguably scope for agreement that at 
least some serious abuses should be subject to jurisdiction, and Congress 
could delineate some narrower set of crimes, as it has done in proposed 
legislation.23  Alternatively, prosecutorial discretion to refrain from 
prosecuting overly sensitive cases might serve as another safety valve. 
Nevertheless, closing jurisdictional loopholes, while important, is not 
sufficient.  Indeed, even under the current jurisdictional scheme more 
prosecutions could have been pursued, which implies both that we could be 
doing a better job right now in holding contractors responsible for abuses 
and that closing jurisdictional loopholes cannot be the only answer.  For 
example, in the case of David Passaro, federal prosecutors were able to 
secure a conviction by using the Special Maritime and Territorial 
Jurisdiction, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over crimes committed 
overseas in certain types of facilities controlled by the U.S. government.  
Because Passaro interrogated the subject in such a facility, the courts had 
jurisdiction.  Using the same approach, courts might also have exercised 
jurisdiction over the contract interrogators at Abu Ghraib.  Likewise, 
prosecutors encountered jurisdictional and other difficulties in the Nisour 
Square case, illustrating serious flaws in the current legal and regulatory 
regime that governs contractors overseas. Although prosecutors initiated 
proceedings against five Blackwater guards in December of 2008, a district 
court judge threw out the case a year later.  The court of appeals reinstated 
the prosecution on April 22, 2011, so it seems set finally to go to trial, but 
jurisdictional and other enforcement issues may resurface.24  Accordingly, 
the lack of prosecution in these cases suggests problems beyond 
jurisdiction. 
Thus, we also need to restructure our institutions of enforcement to 
build more expertise and set better incentives for pursuing these cases. For 
many years, responsibility for contractor abuse cases lay with U.S. 
Attorneys offices around the country, and lawyers there did not necessarily 
see these cases as a  high priority, or have the experience needed to 
prosecute them successfully.  We need a designated office within the 
Department of Justice to focus on these types of cases, and we should 
require the office to report on its efforts.  Special expertise to handle such 
cases is particularly significant in covert cases, when issues such as 
“graymail” might arise.  Graymail is a type of blackmail in which suspects 
might threaten to disclose information that would put national security 
interests at risk.  Indeed, according to the prosecutor, graymail was an issue 
in the Passaro case, and having an office with special expertise in handling 
such security threats would likely help.  At the same time, we need better 
 
 23. Id. §3273 (limiting federal jurisdiction to egregious crimes such as murder and 
assault). 
 24. United States v. Slough, 641 F. 3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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evidence gathering in the field.25 It took two weeks for FBI investigators to 
get to Nisour Square to gather information, and ultimately it was largely the 
evidentiary problems that caused this case to fall apart. Thus, I support 
CEJA’s provisions requiring theater investigative units to gather evidence 
in cases of abuse. 
II.  USING CONTRACTUAL TERMS 
Contractual terms can also be an important tool of accountability and 
constraint.  To begin with, contracts should explicitly require that 
contractors obey norms and rules that implement public law values.  For 
example, terms of each agreement could identify relevant legal frameworks 
and provide that private contractors must abide by applicable legal rules 
within those frameworks. Similarly, contracts should provide for specific 
training of contractors that would better enable contractors to abide by those 
rules. 
In a study I conducted of all of the publicly available Iraq contracts 
several years into the U.S. engagement there, I concluded that the contracts 
fell far short in these respects, particularly in comparison to state and local 
privatization contracts for prison management, health care, and other 
services.26  And even as of 2007, four years after the beginning of the Iraq 
War and six years after the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan, the 
DoD and State Department had strikingly different contracting practices.  
For example, a report produced by the Secretary of State’s Panel on 
Personal Protective Services in Iraq observed after two weeks of on-the-
ground interviews that security contractors in Iraq were operating “in an 
environment that is chaotic, unsupervised, deficient in oversight and 
accountability, and poorly coordinated.”27  Moreover, the report noted a lack 
of “parallelism” between the State Department rules and those of the U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) on the use of force by contracted security 
in Iraq, and in particular urged the State Department to revise its rules to 
clarify that “if an authorized employee must fire his/her weapon, he/she 
must fire only aimed shots; fire with due regard for the safety of innocent 
bystanders; and make every effort to avoid civilian casualties.”28 
Since then, the DoD and State Department have entered into a 
Memorandum of Agreement29 to harmonize their approaches to standards 
 
 25. See DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 59-60. 
 26. Id. at 69-101. 
 27. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S PANEL ON PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
IN IRAQ 4 (2007)), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/ State/94122.pdf.  Panel 
members included Eric J. Boswell, George A. Joulwan, J. Stapelton Roy, and Patrick F. 
Kennedy. 
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Dep’t of Def. and the U.S. 
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for private security contractors as well as contract management more 
broadly. This effort has earned the praise of watchdogs such as the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO)30 and the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).31  Yet the fact that the rules 
regarding the use of force for contractors were so different for so long is 
troubling.  In addition, the Memorandum of Agreement covers only security 
contractors, not other contractors, such as covert operatives, translators, or 
logistics contractors, who carry weapons for self-defense and who therefore 
might use force.  Moreover, the contract language remains relatively broad 
and vague.  More useful terms would refer to particular obligations under 
international law, such as specific human rights or humanitarian law 
treaties, as opposed to the general command to obey applicable law. 
Provisions must also be made for increased contract monitoring, which 
would help ensure an important additional check on abuses. Such 
monitoring should include, to begin with, sufficient numbers of trained and 
experienced government contracts monitors.  In addition, other government 
personnel who interact with contractors, such as commanders, uniformed 
military personnel, or agency officials must understand contractors’ roles 
and in some cases have their own oversight capability.  Finally, government 
ombudspersons – leaders of independent offices charged with providing 
enhanced oversight – serve as an important supplement to contract 
monitors.  Thus, at a minimum, it is essential that government agencies 
devote sufficient resources to ensure that these requirements are 
implemented in a meaningful way.  Contractual terms, such as mandatory 
contractor self-evaluation and performance benchmarks, can increase the 
impact of monitoring. 
As with contractual language, both the George W. Bush administration 
and now the Obama administration have also made some strides in 
monitoring contracts.  Agencies have improved contract monitoring to 
some degree since the early days of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Indeed, the GAO concluded in 2008 that the “DOD and the State 
Department have improved oversight and coordination” of security 
contractors.32  For example, in 2007 the DoD established a new unit, the 
Armed Contractor Oversight Division, to monitor security contractors.  This 
division has improved tracking of serious incidents involving armed 
 
Dep’t of State on USG Private Sec. Contractors (Dec. 5, 2007). 
 30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD AND STATE 
DEPARTMENT HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION OF PRIVATE SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN IMPROVEMENTS 4 
(2008) [hereinafter REBUILDING IRAQ]. 
 31. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, 
SIGIR 09-019, OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE PROCESSES FOR REPORTING, INVESTIGATING, AND 
REMEDIATING SERIOUS INCIDENTS INVOLVING PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ  1-2 
(2009). 
 32. REBUILDING IRAQ, supra note 30, at 1, 4, 9, 19. 
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security contractors, and has increased accountability.  Furthermore, 
military units are now “more responsible for providing oversight” including 
“reporting and investigating as well as contract management.”33  Thus, 
according to the GAO, on-the-ground military units are no longer working 
in ignorance of contracts, or even worse, at cross-purposes with contract 
monitors.  And the State Department has increased oversight of security 
contractors by placing diplomatic security agents in each security contractor 
motorcade and has increased the number of government security agents.34 
Yet significant challenges remain.  As recently as 2008, Jack Bell, then 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness), 
emphasized that “faced with this unprecedented scale of dependence on 
contractors, we have confronted major challenges associated with visibility, 
integration, oversight, and management of a large contractor force working 
alongside our deployed military personnel that, frankly, we were not 
adequately prepared to address.”35   Indeed, even in praising the DoD and the 
State Department for their increased contract monitoring, the GAO 
questioned whether the agencies had enough personnel in place to be 
effective.  As the GAO put it, “It is not clear whether DOD can sustain this 
increase [in staffing].”36  Indeed, according to the report, the Army “lacks 
the leadership and military and civilian personnel to provide sufficient 
contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime missions.”37  In a 
separate 2009 audit of the State Department security contracts with 
Blackwater, the SIGIR found that the contract officer representatives 
(CORs) for the contract were severely overtaxed: “[S]ince the COR duties 
are collateral and are assigned to special agents who spend most of their 
time planning and executing their own protective missions, the special 
agents have little time for contract administration or monitoring.”38 These 
reports strongly suggest that contract management remains a side job that 
gets short shrift in the face of other, overwhelming duties.  Even the DoD’s 
recent commitment to hire twenty thousand new contract-monitoring 
 
 33. Id. at 4, 9. 
 34. Id. 
 35. The Hon. P. Jackson Bell, Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. (Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness), U.S. Dep’t of Def., Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
and Gov't Affairs (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test 
Bell080227.pdf. 
 36. REBUILDING IRAQ, supra note 30, at 4. 
 37. Id. at 16. 
 38. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
& THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION (SIGIR), SIGIR-
09-21, AUD/IQO-09-16, JOINT AUDIT OF BLACKWATER CONTRACT AND TASK ORDERS FOR 
WORLDWIDE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN IRAQ 32 (2009). 
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personnel by 2015,39 though a step in the right direction, is probably 
insufficient given the huge growth in contract labor over the past decade. 
Another contractual tool for promoting public law values is 
accreditation. Independent organizations, often consisting of experts or 
professionals in the field, can evaluate and rate private contractors. 
Government authorities can then require that contractors receive certain 
ratings.  Or government entities or international institutions, such as the 
United Nations, could develop accreditation regimes.  For example, both 
the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have supported what might 
be termed an international accreditation process, sometimes referred to as 
the Montreux Document, for private military and security contractors.  
Initiated by the Swiss government and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the process now includes a code of conduct and involves 
participation by governments, industry, and civil society groups.  The code 
sets standards for practices such as vetting and training of military and 
security firms.40  Accreditation would also require establishment of a 
grievance procedure and an auditing process, both of which are 
contemplated in the code, though the precise grievance mechanism and 
audit requirements remain to be worked out.41 
Finally, Congress or the relevant agencies could improve contract 
enforcement.  Currently, even in the domestic setting, generally only 
government officials and contractors may enforce contract violations, 
though Congress has provided for limited private enforcement against those 
who have defrauded the government.  Measures that would enhance 
enforcement might include greater opportunities for third-party enforcement 
actions in domestic courts, expanded whistleblower protections for 
contractor employees, and privatized grievance procedures. 
Many of these contractual reforms are relevant to the privatization of 
covert activities.  The need for more specific contractual terms regarding 
training and the use of force, for example, applies equally to contract spies 
as to contract security guards protecting military installations, although the 
precise terms might vary depending on the nature of the particular 
operation.  Similarly, more and better trained oversight personnel, whether 
in DoD or the CIA or other agencies, is critical.  And inspectors general 
should monitor and report on the activities of contractors engaged in covert 
operations.  If the publication of such reports would compromise national 
security, transmission to congressional committees without broader public 
disclosure is possible. 
 
 39. Elise Castelli, How DOD Will Add 20,000 Acquisition Officers, DEFENSE NEWS, 
Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4035334. 
 40. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, Nov. 9, 
2010, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/ 
sede150311audcodeofconduct_/sede150311audcodeofconduct_en.pdf. 
 41. Id. at 3, 15-16. 
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Accreditation is particularly relevant here.  Firms hired by any 
government agency to perform covert work ought to receive some sort of 
pre-clearance or accreditation based on various benchmarks of quality.  The 
Montreux framework could be broadened to apply explicitly to firms 
engaged in covert activities.42 
Expanding enforcement of contractual reforms in the case of privatized 
covert activities may pose special challenges.  Indeed, it is unlikely that 
Congress will allow third party beneficiaries to challenge the terms even of 
logistics contracts, let alone contracts involving covert operations.  And 
expansion of whistleblower protections is also problematic.  But a 
grievance mechanism within an accreditation regime such as the proposed 
Montreux framework is a distinct possibility.  Such a framework could 
preserve some measure of secrecy while allowing for accountability. 
III.  TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Expanding transparency is generally not a viable form of accountability 
and constraint for privatized covert activities.  In Outsourcing War and 
Peace I argue, for example, that an expansion of the FOIA, broader 
whistleblower protections, and mandated disclosure of standard contractual 
terms could help promote public participation by increasing the 
transparency of the contracting process.  I also argue that the agencies 
should gather data on contractor abuses and report that data to Congress and 
the public.  Such reforms, while helpful in the case of security and logistics 
contracting, are unrealistic in cases where secrecy of operations is critical to 
protect U.S. interests. 
Nonetheless, more limited disclosure of contractor activities in covert 
operations is potentially workable.  Thus, agencies might at least report on 
such activities to congressional committees charged with keeping the 
information secret.  Such an inter-branch check on executive authority is 
important, even if it does not entail broad public accounting. 
  
 
 42. The Montreux Document defines private military and security companies 
(PMSCs) as “private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in 
particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings 
and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and 
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.” Montreux Document, 
International Committee of the Red Cross U.N. Document A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Oct. 8, 
2009) Annex, available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/537/10/ 
pdf/N0853710.pdf?OpenElement. 
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IV.  INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE  
Internal organizational compliance structure and the culture of 
organizations – whether agencies or private firms – comprise another, often 
overlooked mechanism of accountability and constraint.  In Outsourcing 
War and Peace, I first review studies of organizational structure and culture 
in other settings, and then, through a series of interviews I conducted with 
uniformed military lawyers, I examine internal structural and cultural 
factors in the U.S. military that promote compliance with certain core 
values.  Specifically, I rely on a broad literature suggesting that the 
existence of certain features within an organization, such as compliance 
agents who are: (1) integrated with operational employees, (2) possess 
strong commitments to core values, (3) have an independent hierarchy for 
promotion, and (4) can invoke an internal sanctions regime, promotes 
accountability and constraint. 
The interviews I conducted with uniformed military lawyers – who can 
be viewed as the compliance agents within the military – suggest the critical 
role that these lawyers play on the battlefield, integrating public values into 
military decisionmaking by training troops in the laws of war and advising 
commanders on issues such as whether a particular targeting decision is a 
“good shoot or a bad shoot.”  Military lawyers, embedded with troops in 
combat and consulting regularly with commanders, have internalized and 
seek to operationalize the core values inscribed in the international law of 
armed conflict, in particular the imposition of limits on the use of force.  
They also have a somewhat independent hierarchy for promotion, which 
depends on the assessments of more senior military lawyers as well as their 
battlefield commanders.  And they can encourage their commanders to 
invoke a strong sanctions regime, the military justice system, when soldiers 
cross the line and commit abuses.  To be sure, the lawyers are not always 
successful, and it would be simplistic to assume that the U.S. military 
always obeys international law. But the stories these military lawyers tell 
support the idea that the presence of lawyers on the battlefield can – at least 
sometimes – produce military decisions that are more likely to comply with 
international legal norms.43 
By contrast, contractors largely fall outside this organizational 
accountability framework.  While they may receive some training in the 
rules regarding the use of force, that training does not typically include 
updated advice on the battlefield about how the rules apply in specific 
scenarios likely to arise.  Contractors also do not receive ongoing 
situational advice from military lawyers or even from private lawyers 
employed by their firms.  Finally, the accountability system that has applied 
to troops has not, at least until recently, been extended to contractors.  Thus, 
 
 43. DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 144-188. 
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many crucial, though subtle, mechanisms of compliance with public values 
are significantly weakened in the privatization process. 
One response to this problem is to give the uniformed lawyers more of 
a role in advising contractors.  They might do more training of contractors 
authorized to use force and provide consultation or supervision in the field.  
And they might take a more active role in recommending punishment from 
within the military justice system for contractors accused of committing 
abuses.  Indeed, Congress enacted legislation several years ago that 
expanded the power of military courts to try contractors.44  This approach is 
potentially available for some categories of contractors engaging in covert 
activities.  Military lawyers might provide training to military contractors or 
contractors from other agencies working with the military regarding the 
applicable laws of war. 
When contractors are engaging in activities outside conflict zones or are 
not partnering with the military, this approach would be less feasible.  
Nonetheless, an embedded oversight role for civilian lawyers is a 
possibility.  For example, CIA lawyers are involved in the clearance process 
for drone attacks.45  Of course, it is unclear whether the CIA has inculcated 
the same culture of respect for the rule of law that appears to be ingrained 
within the uniformed military, or whether the CIA’s organizational 
structures support an independent cadre of compliance agents, as we see in 
the military context. 
Nevertheless, embedding government lawyers is not the only possible 
approach.  Even for contractors conducting covert operations, we could 
require contract firms to install internal accountability agents with a role 
comparable to that of uniformed lawyers in the military.  Such agents 
should be responsible for training employees, monitoring their actions, 
tracking abuses, and imposing sanctions in the case of such abuses.  
Perhaps the decision by Academi (formerly Blackwater) to appoint former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft as their lead ethics agent is a step in this 
direction.46 
CONCLUSION 
There are, of course, potential difficulties with all four mechanisms of 
accountability and constraint described in this essay, whether the privatized 
activities are covert or not, and a detailed discussion of implementation is 
 
 44. 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10) (2006). 
 45. Tara Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, at 34. 
 46. Eyder Peralta, Ashcroft Joins Former Blackwater Firm as Head of Ethics 
Committee, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (May 4, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2011/05/04/135991896/ashcroft-joins-former-blackwater-firm-as-head-of-ethics-
committee. See supra note 12. 
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beyond the scope of this article.  One overall objection that might be raised, 
however, deserves a response here.  It might be suggested that any reform 
proposal to provide better accountability for contractors is inherently 
unrealistic because one of the main reasons governments privatize is 
precisely to avoid the kinds of constraints that I argue should be imposed.  
Yet governments are not monolithic, and there are undoubtedly many 
people within bureaucracies, such as contract monitors, who would 
welcome (and lobby for) mechanisms that increase accountability.  In 
addition, legislatures sensitive to public opinion may be able to play an 
increased oversight role, and NGOs and international organizations can 
sometimes pressure states to adopt at least some of the approaches I have 
discussed.  Moreover, even when states fail to act, NGOs can take actions 
on their own – such as adopting accreditation and rating schemes – that may 
have a significant impact. And these efforts may occur domestically or 
through transnational legal and political processes.  Finally, once the focus 
moves beyond simply trying to impose direct legal liability, governments 
may be more willing to consider alternative contract language, internal 
organizational structure, and public participation values in drafting and 
awarding contracts in the first place.  The problem is that neither policy-
makers nor scholars have sufficiently focused on privatization or the 
alternative mechanisms of constraint that the privatized relationship opens 
up. 
Most importantly, while it is of course true that these various 
mechanisms of constraint will not solve the problems posed by 
privatization, either separately or in combination, it is not as if even non-
privatized foreign affairs activity is subject to sufficient mechanisms of 
accountability or constraint.  And in any event, given that foreign affairs 
privatization is probably here to stay, those who care about human dignity, 
public participation, and transparency will need to think creatively about a 
variety of plausible means to constrain privatization.  We will not be able to 
simply resist the privatization trend altogether.  In addition, once we seek to 
constrain privatization, rather than eliminate it outright, we may find that 
while outsourcing sometimes threatens these values, it does not always do 
so.  Indeed, the very fact of privatization may actually create some 
interesting and surprising spaces where public law values may be protected, 
and perhaps even expanded. 
In all of this analysis, it should be emphasized that the law in action 
matters just as much as, if not more than, the law on the books.  Of course, 
if State Department officials can plausibly argue that federal laws do not 
give U.S. federal courts jurisdiction to try State Department contractors for 
crimes they commit overseas, Congress should enact new legislation to 
make it clear that those contractors are indeed subject to U.S. criminal law.47  
 
 47. As noted above, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act gives federal courts 
the power to hear criminal cases involving contractors from agencies other than the DoD if 
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But the institutional and organizational arrangements to ensure that those 
laws are enforced – the ability of Congress to scrutinize the Department of 
Justice, the expertise and incentives of the lawyers within the Department 
of Justice, and the ability of the Department of Justice to gather evidence 
overseas – are just as significant as the formal legal rules.  Indeed, the 
intangible norms of a particular organization’s culture – as the uniformed 
judge advocates’ commitment to the principle that the use of force is 
limited during armed conflict powerfully attests – are perhaps the most 
significant factor of all.  We need to bring to the surface these often hidden 
and intangible elements in responding to the particular challenges that arise 
from foreign affairs privatization. 
Privatization in the international realm is a crucial field of study, and it 
is essential that we have more dialogue like this one among international 
and domestic scholars, advocates, and policy-makers concerning 
appropriate responses to this trend.  And more attention must be paid to 
finding a variety of mechanisms to constrain contractor malfeasance and 
hold private actors more accountable both to those affected by their 
activities and to those footing the bill.  In the coming years we shall need to 
think broadly about how best to respond to the threats posed by the 
outsourcing of governmental functions to private entities. Only through 
such efforts will we be able to find ways to protect crucial public law values 
in the era of privatization that is already upon us. 
 
their employment “relates to supporting a Department of Defense mission.”  18 U.S.C. 
§3267(1)(A)(II)(ii) (2006). 
